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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a civil action dealing with the modification
of a divorce decree provision regardinq the disposition of
real property.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT
Subsequent to the entry of a Decre^ of Divorce in the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah (JTounty/ defendant
initiated an Order to Show Cause proceeding seeking modification of a Stipulation and the Decree provision relative to
the real property of the parties.

The lower court modified

the Decree to require the plaintiff to pay to the defendant
$70 per month rental on the family hom^.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT Old APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks reversal of the lower court f s order
I
and requests that the parties1 financial obligations be
returned to their former status/ thereby eliminating the
imposition of the rental payment upon the plaintiff.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT IN AND FOR
I

THE STATE OF UTAH
WANDA MAUREEN PETERSON,
Plaintiff,

APPEAL BRIEF

vs.
Civil No. 57,643

MICHAEL L. PETERSON,
Defendant.

Case No.
FACTS

This matter initially came before Jthe Fourth District Court c
I
the 29th day of July, 1981. A Decree of Divorce was entered as
between the parties on the 21st day of August, 1981. Pursuant to
agreements and stipulations made between the parties tc the actioi
and based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entere*
by the Court, paragraph 9 of the Decrep of Divorce provides as
follows:
The plaintiff is awarded thel possession- of the
family home of the parties for a period of five
(5) years. From five (5) ydars from the date
of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the
plaintiff is given the option to purchase the
family home of the parties by paying to the
defendant the sum of $18,500.00. In the event
the plaintiff chooses not to purchase the
family home of the parties then the defendant
is given the option to purchase the family home
of the parties by paying to the plaintiff the
sum of $18,500.00. In the jevent neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant choses [sic] to

purchase the family home of the parties, the
home is ordered to be sold and all obligations
owed on the home and costs incident towards the
sale of the home satisfied, and the proceeds
derived therefrom divided equally between the
plaintiff and the defendant.
The defendants equity was thus predetermined.
Paragraph 5(h) of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered concurrently with the Divorce Decree stated that in
conjunction with her possession of the family home, the plaintiff
was required to pay the first and second mortgage payments thereon,
Less than one year later, on July 26, 1982, an Order to Show
Cause was issued by the Court having been initiated by the
defendant.

In its Affidavit seeking the Order, the defendant

alleged, as a change of circumstances, that the plaintiff had
remarried and the defendant was in need of his equity from the
home.

It sought an order from the Court to force the sale of the

home or force the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of
$18,500.00, his equity in the home.
On September 29, 1983, the Court denied the defendant's
request stating:
In this matter the Court does not find a
sufficient compelling reason to modify the
stipulation entered into at the time of the
divorce. Using the case of
Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412, as a guide,
the Court finds in the case at hand that the
parties at the time of the stipulation were
both represented by counsel, that the
stipulation was the product of an agreement
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between the parties. The parties were
questioned by the Court and they indicated that
they understood the stipulation/ that both were
dating and in fact considering remarriage, and
finally, that the stipulation was approved by
the Court. The Court havinglbeen the Trial
Court on the Foulger Case felt that stronger
compelling reasons existed in that case than
does exist in the evidence presented in the
case now before the Court. There is no
evidence that the property has deteriorated
but, in fact, has been improved. Accordingly,
the Court denies defendant's Motion'to Modify
Divorce Decree with respect to the real
property.
In that same decision, pursuant tb the request of the
defendant, the Court granted him the custody of the couple 1 s mine
son and deleted his support payments tjo the plaintiff with respec
to the son.
Only three months later, once ag^in upon the initiation of t
defendant, an

Order to Show Cause was issued by the Fourth

District Court seeking an order that tfhe plaintiff pay to the
defendant 1/2 of the fair rental value of the home and secondly •
seeking child support from the plaintiff in the sum of $130.00 t<
be paid to the defendant for the care of the minor son, Jeff,
whose custody he had sought and gained in the previous Order to
Show Cause hearing.

For a change of hircumstances warranting su

an order, the defendant alleged essentially the same things as h

I
had in the previous affidavit; that the plaintiff was remarried,
that his income was insufficient for his needs and, additionally
that he now had the care and custody of the minor son.
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Once again the Court found that a sufficient change in
circumstances had not been demonstrated to warrant any modification
of the decree.
About 8 months later/ the defendant/ for the third time/
petitioned the Court for an Order to modify the Decree and require
the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the reasonable rental value
of the home.

The defendant again alleged the plaintiff's

remarriage and the defendant's reduced income as the changed
circumstances warranting modification.

Additionally he alleged

that because of the plaintiff having paid off the second mortgage/
he was entitled to receive rent payments from her for living in the
home .
Contrary to its prior findings and rulings/ the Court, upon
the third hearing, decided that these occurrences were indeed
tantamount to a material change in circumstances "not contemplated
at the time of the stipulation between the parties/ namely/ the
remarriage of Mrs.

Peterson and the retiring of the second

mortgage upon the property..."
Based thereon/ the Court ordered the plaintiff to pay the
defendant the sum of $70.00 rental on the home while occupied by
her.
The plaintiff alleges that such a Finding and Order was a
clear abuse of the Court's discretion and thus appeals.
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POINT I
UTAH LAW IS CLEAR THAT A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OF
MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IS REQUIRED IN ORDER
TO JUSTIFY THE MODIFICATION OF AN
ORIGINAL DIVORCE DECREE.
Under Utah law# for the trial couri t to modify a Divorce Deere
it is required that the party seeking t he modification demonstrate
that the circumstances prevailing at th e time of the original
decree have undergone a substantial change/ that such changes are
material and that the nature of the changes warrant a modificatioi
See Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.id 1297 (Utah 1981),
Kessimakis v.

Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 10&0 (Utah 1978),

Zaharias v. Zaharias, 652 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1982).
This requirement was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court as
early as 1916, when the Court in Cody |v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P
952, at 957 stated:
I have no doubt that, under the statute, when
judicial action is properly invoked, the Court,
as to orders which relate to alimony, custody
of children, and award for their support, when
they are continuing and over which the Court
retains a continuing jurisdiction, is
authorized on a proper showing to modify the
decree in such particulars.j But a further
essential to such relief and which is
universally agreed upon, isj that there must
be averments and proof of k change of
circumstances or conditions of the parties.
(Emphasis added)
Moreover, because of the unique nature of real property and
the complicated nature of its relation to such things as taxes

-5-

insurance/ mortgages and title registration, the Courts have tended
to require an enhanced showing of alteration in the material
circumstances of the parties when a modification is sought which
relates to real estate.
In a case very much similar to that of the present/ the Utah
State Supreme Court recently held:
Where a disposition of real property is in
question, however. Court should properly be
more reluctant to grant a modification. In the
interest of securing stability in titles,
modifications in a Decree of Divorce making
disposition of real property are to be granted
only upon a showing of compelling reasons
arising from a substantial and material
change in circumstances.
Foulger v. Foulger/ 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981).
The Court in Foulger went on to hold that matters which are
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of stipulation
or divorce can hardly be thought of as circumstances sufficiently
radical to justify modification.
the instant case,

Specifically the Court stated "in

no such compelling reasons have been shown to

exist which warrant the modification granted.

Ma-tters such as

payments on the home/ and maintenance and upkeep thereof/ certainly
must have been within the plaintiff's contemplation at the time she
agreed to the disposition set forth in the original Divorce
Decree."
It is clear that the defendant's burden/ under the facts of
this case,

required him to show that there had been, since the time
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of the entry of the original divorce decree, significant and
material changes in the circumstances cjf the parties.
Additionally, since there was an agreement between the parties
which involved real property, the defendant's burden is enhanced
require that he show the following:
(1)

That there are compelling reasons arising from:

(2) Substantial and
(3) material changes in circumstances,
(4) which were not within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of any ptior stipulations,
or agreements at the time of the divorce.
The facts which the defendant presented to the trial court t
sustain his burden were insufficient on all counts.

The defendan

having so failed, the trial court should have proceeded no furthe
By continuing, it clearly abused its discretion in subsequently
modifying the original order.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO MAKE A SUFFICIENT EVIDENTIARY
SHOWING TO JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS AND MODIFICATION
(a)

The Defendant Has Failed to Demonstrate a Substantial

Change of Material Circumstances Sincfe the Entry of the Decree o
Divorce.
In the short time span of about |2 1/2 years since the entry
the Decree of Divorce, the Court has been subjected to no less t
three Order to Show Cause hearings initiated by the defendant, a
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based on substantially the same allegations of changed
circumstances and all seeking to modify the real property
arrangement which the parties originally stipulated to.
In the first two Orders to Show Cause/ the Court held that the
defendant had failed to show a sufficient change in material
circumstances to warrant modification.

In its memorandum submitted

in support of the third petition for modification/ defendant's own
counsel states that "the facts in this case have not substantially
varied since the 31st day of March/ 1983/ at which time this matter
was before the Court for hearing on defendant's motion to modify
the decree to provide for reasonable rental on the home upon the
basis that the income of the defendant had substantially reduced
and plaintiff's income had increased.

Plaintiff had also remarried

since the divorce and was living in the home with her present
husband."

Thus, by the Court's finding and by the admission of

defendant's own counsel, the facts in this case have not
substantially varied since the time of the entry of the decree.
This being the case there was not a sufficient bajsis for the Court
to look further.
In Gale v. Gale/ 123 Utah 277, 258 P.2d 986 (1953), the wife
was awarded custody of the four minor children of the marriage and
the husband ordered to pay child support at the monthly rate of
$25.00 per child.

Eighteen months later the wife sought an

increase in child support to $35.00 per month, but the Court
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refused even this seemingly reasonable request because the wife
failed to demonstrate any change in circumstances.

Citing to

Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, 225 P 76 (1924), the Gale Court
supports the long standing principle in domestic law:
The legal principle controlling in this case is
that a divorce decree may not be modified unless
it is alleged, proved and the trial court finds
that the circumstances upon which it was based
have undergone a substantial cjhange. (Emphasis
added)
Reiterating this same requirement aire the current cases of
Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982), and Leah v. Bowers, 651
P.2d 1213 (Utah 1983), and those previously cited in Point I.
As a consequence of divorce and the subsequent necessity of
separate residences and maintenance, th ere is a substantial
likelihood that because of the division of assets, each party to
the divorce will experience a lower sta jndard of living than they
enjoyed as a family.

As the Gale Court) stated, "when one blanket

is cut to fit two beds, it seldom will cover them both."
mere need on the side of one party or

Thus,

he other is not the sole

consideration and not even a primary consideration in the Court's
review of a petition for modification.

In this light, the

defendant's contention that he is "in need" of his equity from th(
home, is not sufficient justification to modify the decree.
The showing of substantial and material change in
circumstances is a requirement which npt only protects the Courts

-9-

from being overburdened by the constant rehashing of the
circumstances relative to each party's situation subsequent to the
divorce/ but also protects- the parties from harrassment/ paranoia
in their daily affairs and "ping-pong" custody hearings.

The need

for the standard has often been recognized by the courts/ one of
which proffered:
Absent such a requirement/ a Decree of Divorce
would be subject to ad infinitum appellate review
and readjustment according to the concepts of
equity held by succeeding trial judges.
Foulger, 414.
(b)

The Defendant Has Not Presented Evidence Sufficient to

Warrant Modification of the Stipulated Disposition of the Real
Property Involved.
In seeking to resolve the differences between the parties in
the original divorce matter/ the parties discussed and agreed to
certain matters/ one of which was the disposition of the home.
This subject was dealt with at length in the findings of the Court
and in paragraph 9 of the Decree as set forth in wits entirety
above under Plaintiff's "Facts."
At a subsequent Order to Show Cause hearing/ initiated by the
defendant, seeking to alter the terms of paragraph 9/ the trial
court found:
In this matter the Court does not find a
sufficient compelling reason to modify the
stipulation entered into at the time of

-10-

the divo rce. Us ing th e case f Foulger v. Foulger,
626 P.2d 412, as a gui de the ourt finds in the
case at hand tha t the partie at the time of the
stipulat ion were both repres ted by counsel
and that the sti pulati on was he product of an
agreemen t between the partie si. The parties were
question ed by th e Cour t and tney indicated
that the y understand t he sti pulation, that
both wer e dating and i n fact [considering
marriage, and finally, that th e stipulation
was approved by the Cot
>urt. (ID ecision of Judge
Sam, September 29, 198;
$ 2 ) . (EJm phasis added)
In the case of Callister v. Callisfter, 1 Utah.2d 34, 261 P
944 (1953), the Utah court clearly recognized the sanctity of
property settlements as distinguished from alimony settlements.
making such a distinction, the Court cited to Hough v. Hough, 2
Cal.2d 605, 160 P.2d 15 (1945) appearihq to adopt with approval
following language therefrom:
This does not mean that payments under property
settlement agreements may be modified even though
incorporated in the Decree. They may not.
[Citations omitted] But in such a situation
there is not the same policy. The settlement
of property rights should be final in order to
secure stability of titles. Support allowances
on the other hand should be(subject to the
discretion of the Court as Justice may •
require... It has been loosely stated
generally in passing that the divorce court has
no jurisdiction to modify a decree based upon a
property settlement agreement. [Citations
omitted] However, that does not mean that the
Court does not have jurisdiction on an
application for modificatioh to decide
correctly or incorrectly whether the Decree is
based upon a property settlement agreement, and
is not subject to modification, or is based
upon alimony or support allowance covenants,
and is subject to modif icatjion. "
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This inflexible position as to property settlements has not
been adopted in toto by the Utah Court/ but the Court has taken a
position which requires that when one seeks to modify the
provisions of a Divorce Decree relative to real property/ the
burden he must carry is substantially greater than that which must
be shown in seeking a modification of alimony or support. In
Despain v. Despain/ 610 P.2d 1303, (Utah 1980), the plaintiff
sought modification of a provision of the separation agreement by
which the plaintiff relinquished "any and all other claims against
the [defendant] so as to constitute a complete separation and
division of the marital estate."

In so doing, the plaintiff gave

up any and all rights which she may have otherwise had to the value
of a trust which had been set up by her husband.
Upon motion, after nearly two years subsequent to the signing
of the agreement and its incorporation into the Decree of Divorce,
the plaintiff sought and the trial court granted an order requiring
an accounting of the trust property and an award to the plaintiff
of one half interest in the trust res.

On appeal, the Supreme

Court explained and held as follows:
Under defendant's argument, plaintiff contracted away all
rights to the trust res pursuant to paragraph 10 of the
separation agreement and property settlement forged by
the parties. In exchange for the $75,000.00 payment frorr
defendant, asserts defendant, plaintiff relinquished "an}?
and all other claims against the defendant." By
defendant's view, the trial court, upon adopting the
parties' agreement as part of the Decree of Divorce,
became bound by its terms and may not now modify such
terms. We agree.
-12-

This issue was most recently before the Court in
Land v. Land/ [605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980)] wherein
we observed that the outright abrogation of the
provisions of a property settlement agreement is
to be resorted to with great reluctance and only
for compelling reasons.
The Court went on to state "[I]n the absence of compelling
equitable considerations/ the terms of the property settlement
agreement are not to be abrogated"/ thus reversing the order
requiring an accounting and division of| the trust res.

(Emphasis

added)
This position was subsequently reijnforced in the Foulger cas<
supra, wherein it was stated:
Where a disposition of real property is in
question/ however, courts should properly
be more reluctant to grant a modification.
In the interest of securing stability in
titles/ modifications in a Decree of Divorce
making disposition of real property are to
be granted only upon a showipg of compelling
reasons arising from a substantial and material
change in circumstances. (Emphasis added)
A review of the record will show that in each of the three
times the defendant petitioned the trial court far a modification
I
the facts he alleged as constituting a substantial change of fact
were pretty much the same.

In the first two instances the Court

found adequate and substantial reasons why the modification shou."
not be granted/ yet/ at the third heading, with substantially th<
same facts before the Court, and even with the defendant's own
counsel admitting in his memo that "the facts in this case have
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not substantially varied since the 31st day of March, 1983..."/
the Court somehow decided that the same facts constituted a
change of circumstances.

Under the facts, it is inconceivable to

this plaintiff that such a finding could occur absent a finding of
abuse of the trial court's discretion.
Unless something can be said for persistence/ no circumstances
have occured which would suffice under the legal requirements/ as
set forth above/ to affect the property disposition as agreed upon
by the parties and as decreed by the Court.

It seems clear from

the record and from the numerous instances in which the plaintiff
has been required to respond to Orders to Show Cause that the
defendant's motive in continuing this procession is to harass the
plaintiff/ disrupt her life/ salve his bitter feelings about her
new husband living in the residence/ which was once shared by them,
to recant on the property agreement which he has now become
disenchanted with, and to get his money out of the property as
quickly as he can.

His motives are made clear by the testimony

given by him at the hearing held before Judge Sanv on March 31/
1983:
Q.
Now we came into court and entered into
an agreement in September of last year that custody
would be formerly [sic] changed and you were
awarded custody of Jeff?
A.
Yes.
Q.
There were a lot of issues that were
heard in September, why didn't you ask for support
in September of last year?
A.
That was the same time that we came in
and asked for the change of the equity in the home
-14-

and I felt that I would get that scj> I didn't ask for
child support,
Q.
After the Judge ruled and said that the
home need not be sold or you need not be awarded
any equity out of that/ that upset you did it not?
A.
Yes, because I felt that'even though the
home was a part of both of us and ^hat we were
separating at that time/ I thought, you know that
is fine. As long as the home is left for my wife
and my girls that is fine, but I will not have
somebody else living in my home rent free and make
more money than me. That is not right.
Q.
Well/ you withheld making payment for
child support/ did you not?
A.
Yes sir I did.
Q.
We had to come back to qourt to get that
straightened out did we not?
A.
Yes we did.
Q.
And it was concluded that your wife was
correct in her record did we not?
A.
That is right.
Q.
And you had to pay that money did you not?
A.
Yes I did.
Q.
And that upset you did it not?
A.
Yes it did.
Q.
You are still upset and that is why you
filed this current action it is not?
A.
That is not true.
|
Q.
And you are going to be continaully upset
until that house is sold?
A.
Well, I don't think I will really be
continually upset but it does, it? bothers me to know
that you got $18/500.00 sitting Inhere that is not
making you any interest at all. It is not working
for you/ it is not doing anything.
Q.
Well/ you have remarried have you not?
A.
Yes.
(Transcript of the March 31, 1983 hearing, pp. 19-20)
In light of this testimony and ib view of the numerous
instances on which the defendant has petitioned the Court to ach
his objectives/ which are contrary to the settlement agreement
arrived at by the parties and adopteq by the Court/ this Court's
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language in several instances speaks directly to this defendant.
the case of LeBreton v. LeBreton, 604 P.2d 469 (Utah 1979), whic
involved the reconsideration of a property distribution made in
divorce decree, Justice Hall in his dissenting opinion stated:
I am constrained to note that if matters of
this type are to be viewed as within the
continuing jurisdiction of the Court, any
litigant, once satisfied with a stipulated
divorce settlement, but becomes disenchanted
therewith because of a change in market values,
(up or down), need only appeal to the Court to
give him a second chance by way of
reformation. Such is not the law of contracts
and should not be the law of "equity" as it
pertains to decrees of divorce which divide
property based upon stipulations.
More succinctly and more recently, in the case of
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980), Justice Hall, this time
writing for a unanimous court, stated forcefully:
True it is that, in making a division of
property by a decree of divorce a trial court
is governed by general principles of equity.
It is likewise true that the Court retains
continuing jurisdiction over the parties and
may modify the decree due to a change in
circumstances, equitable considerations again
to govern. It must, however, be added that,
when a decree is based upon a property
settlement agreement, forged by the parties and
sanctioned by the Court, equity must take such
agreement into consideration. Equity is not
available to reinstate rights and privileges
voluntarily contracted away simply because
one has come to regret the bargain made.
Accordingly, the law limits the continuing
jurisdiction of the Court where property
settlement agreement has been incorporated into
the decree, and the outright abrogation of the
provisions of such an agreement is only to be
resorted to with great reluctance and for
compelling reasons! (Emphasis added)
-16-

The facts stated by the defendant in support of his allegation
of changed circumstances, do not come anywhere near the threshold
of meeting the burden as set forth in the case law above.

Were he

seeking a modification of the alimony or child custody, the Court
may have perhaps been within its bounds in modifying the decree.
Under the present circumstances, however, the Court clearly
misapplied the law and abused its discretion.
(c)

The Facts Which the DefendantjCites as Substantial

Changes in Material Circumstances Are Changes Which Were Originall
Contemplated By the Parties in Arriving)at the Stipulated Agreemen
and Were Changes Which Were Reasonably Certain and Fixed.
In arriving at terms in a divorce agreement or stipulation or
either which are amenable to both sides it is understood that ther
are possibilities for change in the future which should be dealt
with as they arise.
children grow

For instance, it is reasonably certain that <

their needs will increase.

It is also reasonably

certain that there will be income fluctuations to which each part
might be subject and it is also certailn that collateral
circumstances might create a situation where custody arrangements
other than that provided in the divorce will be necessary.

Becai

of these natural changes which are reasonably certain to occur, t
Court has imposed the standard of requiring a substantial change
l

material circumstances before any modification of the decree wil
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be made.

Otherwise, the Court would be subjected to a great number

of modification hearings based on the flimsiest of excuses.
In attempting to avoid this situation, the Court and the
parties to the action are able to make provision in the decree
aimed toward the resolution of future circumstances which are
reasonably likely to occur.

In order to eliminate one bone of

contention which might have arisen between the parties to this
action, they agreed to forego disputes over the real estate by
making it possible for either party to buy out the other's equity
and if that was not possible then after five years the house was to
oe sold with the defendant getting his equity as fixed by the Court
at the time of the Decree.

During the interim the plaintiff was

charged with making the payments on both the first and second
mortgage on the home, keeping up the insurance, paying the taxes
and maintaining the property.
obligation faithfully.

The plaintiff has assumed this

It was, in fact, noted by the Court in its

September 29, 1982 decision that the property "...in fact has been
improved" through the efforts of the plaintiff.
The two major conditions upon which the defendant claims he
should be granted relief from the Decree are that the plaintiff has
remarried and secondly that she has retired one of the two
mortgages against the home by paying it off.

Both of these

circumstances were practically foregone conclusions at the time
the parties entered the agreement.
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The latter of the two

conditions was fixed and certain and Judqe Sam himself/ in his
September 29, 1982 decision again stated that "the parties were
questioned by the Court and they indicated that they understood the
stipulation, that both were dating and in fact considering
carriage, and finally, that the stipulation was approved by the
Court."
I

(Emphasis added)

These conditions having been withim tne Knowledge of the

parties at the time of the stipulation, it was implicit that shoul
I
the occurence of these conditions requite adjustments or provision
such would have been handled within the language of the Decree or
Stipulation.

Because both parties expe(cted that any developments

in this regard would have been handled at the time of the Decree
and, moreover, assumed that any forsee^ble circumstances relative
to the house would be dealt with by th£ language of the Decree, i
is unfair for the defendant to now say' that these anticipated and
foreseeable occurences constitute a change in material
circumstances.

Had the plaintiff soldi the house or had some othe

circumstances as drastic as that occurjed in conjunction with her
remarriage, it may have been appropriate for the Court to view tt
as a substantial change in material circumstances sufficiently
compelling to overcome the stipulation of the parties.

But such

not the case.
Paragraph 9 of the Divorce Decrei^ which terms from the
stipulation

agreed to by the parties), was an integral part of t
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division of the parties 1 assets.

It is only one of the many

concessions and compromises that were necessary in order to
resolve the marital differences between the parties in this case in
amicable fashion.
If one party is now able to invoke conditions and circumstances
that were then foreseeable to the party as a changed circumstance,
then the stipulation and the agreement was given by that party in
bad faith, and preclude him from equitable treatment by the Court.
Without clean hands, he is not deserving of equitable relief.

As

to the plaintiff, who has complied fully with the terms and
conditions set down by the Decree of Divorce and as agreed to by
the parties, should the Decree of Divorce and the conditions
thereto not operate in her favor, then an estoppel ought to be
available to her to prevent the defendant from interfering with her
use and ownership of the property so long as she continues to
maintain paying the mortgage, taxes, insurance and protects the
defendants equity in the home.

She has done all of this and

relies upon his agreement that her right to use the home with no
further obligations than those set out above would not be
interfered with until August of 1986.

That was the agreement as

between the parties and that is the condition which the Court ought
not to interfere with unless the plaintiff breaches her obligation
in that regard or unless some other compelling, significant and
material circumstance arises which would justify equitable relief.
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The facts set forth by the defendant alleged to be material
and substantial changes in circumstance kre not only indadequate in
that regard but were circumstances which were apparent to and
contemplated by the parties in their agreement with regard to the
home.

Therefore/ the facts set forth by the defendant ought not tc

be recognized by the Court as substantial and material changes
compelling enough to modify the original decree.
POINT III
SHOULD THE PLAINTIFF BE REQUIJRED TO PAY MONTHLY
RENTAL TO THE DEFENDANT, T^E DEFENDANT WILL
GET AN ENHANCED RECOVERY
Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Divorce Decree/ the defendant
has been guaranteed that he will receive $18/500.00 from his
equity in the home/ either by purchaseiby the plaintiff or pursuai

I

to its sale in 1986 as required by the Decree of Divorce.

If the

plaintiff is required to pay the defendant $70.00 per month renta
in addition to guaranteeing that he wijll receive $18,500.00 upon
sale of the home/ the defendant's tot41 recovery based on a rente
period of 36 months, plus his equity/ will be $21,020.00.
In effect/ should this Court affirm the trial court's
decision/ the plaintiff will have been effectively penalized for
(1) having remarried and (2) having been diligent in retiring th
debt which encumbered the family home;.

She has been diligent in

making all payments with regard to the home and as aforemention€
has made improvements to the property which have increased the
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value of the home.

She has further sought to improve m atters for

herself and the children by remarrying.

For having don e so the

Court now seeks to impose upon her that which is for al 1 practical
purposes a punishment.

By so doing the Court also gran ts to the

defendant an unwarranted boon.

He makes no payments (m ortgage,

taxes, nor insurance) in regard to the house, he makes no
investment of time, labor or money in its maintenance, repair or
improvement, yet he is guaranteed a return of $18,500.0 0 plus,
pursuant to order of the Court, an additional $2,520.00 in rental
fees.
Such an arrangement does not accord with the equit able
considerations which the Court should have given to the entire
situation and such a "punitive" order ought to be overt urned.
CONCLUSION
The appellant in this case has made great eff orts to
comply with the original order of the Court, which orde r
incorporated an agreement as stipulated to by the parti es and which
agreement was found to be amicable and equitable by the Court and
by the parties at the time of divorce.
Any significant changes in circumstances which were certain
and forseeable by the parties at that time should have been dealt
with in the language of the agreement and decree.

Those conditions

and circumstances which were contemplated by the parties at the
time of the agreement, the controversy of which were implicitly
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waived by the parties at the time of the agreement should have not
later been considered by the trial court as material circumstances
which could be invoked to alter the terifis of the original divorce
decree.
In short/ the trial court abused its discretion and misapplie
the law when it allowed the defendant tfo modify the decree on a
showing of facts which did not even apdroach the threshold of the
burden which the defendant was required to meet.

The basis for hi

petition which sought a modification oif the decree did not allege
facts which constituted compelling reasons arising from substanti<
and material changes in circumstance.
Since it was a stipulation as agreed to by the parties and t

I
Court and dealt with real property, th|e Court should have require
a more significant showing than was presented.

Its failure to sc

require was a manifest abuse of discretion/ a misapplication of t
law and was in disregard of the equities which ought to prevail j
these hearings when and if the circumstances warrant its
invocation.
Plaintiff-appellant therefore seeks

that this Court overtur

the judgment of the lower Court and order dismissal of the
defendants Order to Show Cause.
DATED this

day of June, 1984,

DQN R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appe.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
has been mailed/ postage prepaid/ to Michael D. Esplin, attorney
for defendant, 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84603,
this /&$

day of June, 1984.
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